[sg-ops] Spoofer Report for SGNOG for Mar 2023

[CAIDA Spoofer Project]

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within sgp.

Inferred improvements during Mar 2023:
ASN    Name                                           Fixed-By
56172  AGORACOMMS                                     2023-03-06

Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Mar 2023:
ASN    Name                           First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
4657   STARHUB-INTERNET                  2018-06-11   2023-03-10

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=sgp&no_block=1

Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info at caida.org