[sg-ops] Spoofer Report for SGNOG for May 2023

[CAIDA Spoofer Project]

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within sgp.

Inferred improvements during May 2023:
 none inferred

Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2023:
ASN    Name                           First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
4657   STARHUB-INTERNET                  2018-06-11   2023-05-24

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=sgp&no_block=1

Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info at caida.org